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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 11/07/2011

Accident number: 750

Accident time: 09:15

Accident Date: 10/07/2010

Where it occurred: Task #
AF/0101/00096, MF
0868, Waisal abad
village, Ward-07,
Kabul City

Country: Afghanistan

Primary cause: Field control
inadequacy (?)

Secondary cause: Inadequate training (?)

Class: Excavation accident

Date of main report: None

ID original source: None

Name of source: UNMACCA

Organisation: [Name removed]
Mine/device: AP blast (unrecorded)

Ground condition: not recorded
Date last modified: 11/07/2011

Date record created:
No of victims: 1

No of documents: 1

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system: Not recorded

Coordinates fixed by:

Map east:

Map north:

Map scale:

Map series:

Map edition:

Map sheet:

Map name:

Accident Notes
inadequate investigation (?)
Inadequate detector pinpointing
use of pick (?)
squatting/kneeling to excavate (?)

Accident report
The only report of this accident that has been made available to date is a UNMACCA Lessons
Learned document. Its conversion into a DDAS file has led to some of the original formatting
being lost. Text in square brackets [ ] is editorial. This record will be revised if more
information becomes available.
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The document is reproduced below, edited for anonymity.

LESSONS LEARNED SUMMARY OF [Demining group] DT-07 DEMINING ACCIDENT
INTRODUCTION:
An investigation team was convened by AMAC Kabul to investigate the demining accident
involving [the Victim] the de-miner of [Demining group] DT-07. The accident occurred at 09:15
hours, 10 July 2010 in Task # AF/0101/00096/MF 0868 located in Waisal abad village, Ward07 of Kabul City.
SUMMARY:
Task # AF/0101/00096/MF 0868 is located in a hillside area contaminated with anti-personnel
mines planted by Russian forces in 1983. The area is mined several times after the Russian
withdrawal up to the end of internal conflict in Kabul city. It is recorded by LIS under the
community No. 096 then confirmed by LIAT in 2008. Around 6 accidents have been occurred
on locals in mentioned area.
As per the request of local people, AMAC Central tasked [Demining group] to start clearance
operation there. DT-07 of [Demining group] started clearance of this task on 01 April 2010.
Total size of the task is 141618 m2 out of which 58470 m2 has been cleared so far, 16 AP
PMN2 mines and 1301 different types of ERW found/destroyed by DT-07 up to the accident
time.
On 10 July 2010 at 09:15 AM Mr. [the Victim] the de-miner of mentioned team was working in
his clearance lane, excavating a detected signal, his pick touched on the top of a PMN 2 antipersonnel mine and caused it to go off. According to the investigation report the de-miner has
used the pickaxe to investigate the signal instead of the bayonet and it seems as he used the
pick directly on the top of signal, so caused the accident. Luckily the deminer was fully
dressed with PPE, so he got a superficial injury on hand. Then the victim de-miner evacuated
to Ebni Sina hospital for the treatment and further checking up, after one hour he discharged
from the hospital in normal condition. He is able to continue his activities as a deminer in the
field. It is worth to be mentioned that the deminer remained safe due to appropriate use of the
PPE.
CONCLUSIONS:
Although the consequence of this accident is acceptable, but the accident could had been
avoided if the deminer was not further proceeding from 2nd reading marker with pickaxe.
So carelessness of deminer in terms of using pickaxe in contrary to SOP and lack of control
by command group are the contributing factors to this accident.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
The following points are to be considered:
•

Standard and appropriate tools of prodding and excavation should be used during the
operations.

•

The command group should strengthen their supervision during operation and stop
the de-miners from conducting drills in contrary to SOPs.

•

The de-miners should pinpoint the signal properly, mark it and then start excavation
according to the procedure.
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•

It is the responsibilities of respective IP’s operations department to make sure that a
proper system of command and control exists in the field.

Feedback on any preventive and corrective actions taken by [Demining group] is required to
be submitted to the MACCA office by no later than 7 days, effective to the issue date of this
letter.

Victim Report
Victim number: 941

Name: [Name removed]
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: deminer

Fit for work: yes

Compensation: Not made available

Time to hospital: Not made available

Protection issued: Frontal apron

Protection used: Frontal apron; Long
visor

Long visor

Summary of injuries:
INJURIES: minor Hand
COMMENT: No Medical report was made available. The Victim was discharged from hospital
in one hour in "normal" condition.

Analysis
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a Field Control inadequacy because the Victim
was working in breach of SOPs and his error was not corrected. The secondary cause is
listed as Inadequate training because the Victim either did not pinpoint the detector reading
appropriately or deliberately excavated onto the top of a mine, which implies that he was not
aware of the risks he was running. Because training and field supervision are management
responsibilities, both failings imply a significant Management Control Inadequacy.
The “Inadequate investigation” listed under notes refers to the absence of a full accident
report. The UN supported MACCA has failed to make these widely available for some years,
ignoring the requirements of the IMAS. National staff have been more responsible than the
internationals with overall responsibility.
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